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Abstract:  
We evaluate the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is 
imperfect because of the limited enforcement of intertemporal contracts. Lustig (2004) has 
shown that in such a model the asset pricing kernel can be written as a simple function of the 
aggregate consumption growth rate and the growth rate of consumption of the set of 
households that do not face binding enforcement constraints in that state of the world. These 
unconstrained households have lower consumption growth rates than constrained households, 
i.e. they are located in the lower tail of the crosssectional consumption growth distribution. 
We use household consumption data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey to estimate 
the pricing kernel implied by the model and to evaluate its performance in pricing aggregate 
risk. We employ the same data to construct aggregate consumption and to derive the standard 
complete markets pricing kernel. We find that the limited enforcement pricing kernel 
generates a market price of risk that is substantially larger than the standard complete markets 
asset pricing kernel. 
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Consumption Data 1 Introduction
Consumption-based asset pricing kernelsderived underthecompleterisk sharing,
representative agent (RE) assumption cannot explain the large equity premium,
at least not with plausiblepreference speci…cations(see e.g. Mehra and Prescott,
1985). Models in which the sharing of idiosyncratic risk is limited have the po-
tential to solve the puzzle (see for example Constantinides and Du¢e, 1996).
In these models, the asset pricing kernel, in general, does not only depend on
aggregate consumption but it also depends on the entire distribution of con-
sumption across agents. Di¤erent models provide di¤erent links between the
distribution of consumption and asset pricing kernels. An important task is to
evaluate whether these models are useful in solving the equity premium puzzle.
Recently some studies have done work along this line, either evaluating several
types of incomplete risk sharing models (See for example Brav, Constantinides
and Geczy, 2002, Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002 and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri, 2006)
or exploring the empirical link between asset prices and higher moments of the
consumption growth distribution (Cogley, 2002).
This paper contributes to this research agenda. It evaluates the asset pricing
implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of the
limited enforcement (henceforth LE) of intertemporal contracts, as in Thomas
and Worrall (1988) or Kehoe and Levine (1993). No restrictions are imposed on
the menu of traded assets. Alvarez and Jermann (2001) have explored the asset
pricing implications of LE in a two agent economy, but they have not evaluated
its empirical implications for the cross-sectional distribution of consumption and
asset prices. Lustig (2004) has shown that in a version of this model with a
continuum of agents the asset pricing kernel can be written as a simple function
ofthegrowthrateofconsumptionoftheset ofhouseholdsthat do not facebinding
enforcement constraints in the current state of the world. These unconstrained
households have lower consumption growth rates than those households that
face binding enforcement constraints. This implication of the model allows us to
identify unconstrained households as those in the lower tail of the cross-sectional
consumption growth distribution.
We construct the LE pricing kernel using data on household consumption
expenditures from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) and evaluate
its performance in pricing aggregate risk. To be consistent, we use the same
CE data to construct aggregate consumption and to compute the standard RE
pricing kernel. As documented in previous studies, the RE pricing kernel only
explains a small part of the equity premium. The power of theLE pricing kernel
depends crucially on how we identify unconstrained households but, in general,
it explains a larger fraction of the equity premium than the RE pricing kernel.
12 The Model
We consider a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents that face
aggregate and idiosyncratic endowment shocks, trade state-contingent claims to
consumption on competitive markets and facesolvency constraints that limit the
extent to which agents can go short in these consumption claims. In this section
we …rst describe the underlying physical environment and the market structure,
then wede…nea competitiveequilibrium and…nally weprovideacharacterization
of the asset pricing kernel implied by this model.
2.1 Physical Environment
We denote the current aggregate shock by zt 2 Z and the current idiosyncratic
shock by yt 2 Y ; with Z and Y …nite. Let zt =(z0;: :: ;zt) and yt = (y0;: :: ;yt)
denote the history of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. We use the notation
st = (yt; zt) and st = (yt; zt) and let the economy start at initial node z0: Con-
ditional on idiosyncratic shock y0 and thus s0 = (y0; z0); the probability of a
history st is given by ¼t(stjs0): Individual endowments are given by et(st):
At time 0 households are indexed by their idiosyncratic income shock y0 and
their initial asset position a0: We denote by £0(y0;a0) the initial distribution of
agents over (y0; a0); this initial distribution, together with the initial aggregate
shock z0 serves as initial condition for our economy.
Consumers rank stochastic consumption streams
©
ct(a0; st)
ª
according to
U(c)(s0) =
1 X
t=0
X
st¸s0
¯t¼(stjs0)
ct(a0; st)
1 ¡°
1¡°
(1)
where ° > 0 is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion and ¯ 2 (0; 1) is the
constant time discount factor.
2.2 Market Structure
Householdscantradea completeset ofcontingent consumptionclaims
©
at(a0;st;st+1)
ª
at prices qt(st;st+1). Thus their budget constraints read as
ct(a0;st)+
X
st+1
qt(st;st+1)at(a0; st; st+1) = et(st) +at¡1(a0; st) (2)
These trades are subject to solvency constraints
©
J(a0;st; st+1)
ª
such that
¡at(a0;st;st+1) ·J(a0; st; st+1) (3)
2The solvency constraints, precisely spelled out below, are not too tight, in the
sense of Alvarez and Jermann (2000): a household that has borrowed exactly up
totheconstraint (that is¡at(a0;st;st+1) =J(a0; ;st;st+1)) isindi¤erent between
defaulting on her debt (and su¤ering the corresponding consequences spelled out
below) and repaying (and thus avoiding these consequences). In the standard
complete markets model J(a0; st; st+1) = 1; since in that model households can
fully commit to repay any debt they take on.
Denote by V(a;st) the maximized continuation expected lifetime utility an
agent can attain, if she comes into the current period with assets at¡1(a0; st) =a
and faces constraints (2) and (3): Furthermore let V Aut(st) denote the expected
lifetime utility of an agent from consuming the autarkic allocation ct(a0;st) =
et(st) from node st on.1 Finally let ca
t denote aggregateconsumption (equal to
the aggregate endowment). The market clearing condition reads as
X
st
Z
ct(a0; st)¼(stjs0)d£0 =
X
st
Z
et(st)¼(stjs0)d£0 ´ca
t(zt) for all zt (4)
2.3 Equilibrium
We are now ready to de…ne an equilibrium for this economy.
De…nition 1 Given z0 andan initial distribution £0(y0; a0); an equilibrium with
solvency constraints
©
J(a0; st; st+1)
ª
that are not to tight are consumption and
asset allocations
©
ct(a0;st);at(a0; st; st+1)
ª
and prices
©
qt(st;st+1)
ª
such that
1. Given prices
©
qt(st; st+1)
ª
and constraints
©
J(a0; st; st+1)
ª
; for all (y0;a0)
allocation
©
ct(a0; st);at(a0;st;st+1)
ª
maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3):
2. The solvency constraints are not too tight, that is, satisfy, for all (y0;a0)
and all st+1;
V(J(a0;st;st+1);st+1) =V Aut(st+1)
3. Market clearing: Equation (4) holds
2.4 Characterization of Equilibria
Let (y0;a0) denotethe characteristics of a generic household. In order to charac-
terize equilibrium consumption allocations and thepricing kernel wemake use of
cumulativeLagrangemultipliersf»t(y0;a0)g, inthespirit ofMarcet and Marimon
1The speci…cationof the outside option as autarky is done for simplicity. Any other speci…ca-
tion of the outside option that is only a function of (a;s
t) gives rise to the same characterization
of the asset pricing kernel derived below.
3(1998). Inperiod0 thereisa oneto onemap betweenLagrangemultipliers»0 and
initial wealth a0: Thus let the initial distribution of Lagrange multipliers associ-
ated with the distribution of initial wealth £0(y0; a0) be denoted by ©0(y0; »0).
Henceforth wewill usethenotation »t(y0;a0) and »t(y0;»0) interchangeably. Over
time these Lagrange multipliers increase whenever the solvency constraint of a
household binds, and remains unchanged otherwise. Crucially, this implies that
forall agentsthat are unconstrainedin a current state, theirLagrangemultipliers
all remain unchanged.
As shown by Lustig (2004) the consumption process of a given household is
related to aggregate consumption (endowment) by the risk sharing rule
ct(»0; st) =
£
»t(»0; st)
¤1=° ca
t(zt)
ht(zt)
(5)
where
ht(zt) =
Z £
»t(»0;st)
¤1=° d©t
and ©t isthecross-sectional measureoverconsumptionweights»t(»0;st) inperiod
t; state zt:
To rule out arbitrage opportunities, payo¤s in state zt+1 are priced o¤ the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) of those agents who do not
face any binding constraints in transferring resources to and from that state
(see Alvarez and Jermann, (2000)). Let UC(st;st+1) denote the set of these
agents. The stochastic discount factor is the IMRS of those agents with labels
»¤
0 2 UC(st; st+1); who are unconstrained in state st in their sale of securities
that deliver goods in state st+1 :
mLE
t+1(zt+1) = ¯
µ
ct+1(»¤
0;st+1)
ct(»¤
0;st)
¶¡°
The risk sharing rule in (5) and the fact that for all unconstrained agents the
consumption weights do not change »t+1(»¤
0;st+1) = »t(»¤
0; st) then immediately
imply that the pricing kernel is given by:
mLE
t+1(zt+1) =¯
µ
ca
t+1(zt+1)
ca
t(zt)
¶¡° £
g(zt+1)
¤°
(6)
where g(zt+1) =
ht+1(zt+1)
ht(zt) : Note that in the standard complete markets model
the solvency constraints are never binding, thus the distribution of consumption
weights (Lagrange multipliers) is never changing, and consequently ht+1(zt+1) =
4ht(zt) and g(zt+1) =1 for all zt+1: Therefore, we recover the well-known stochas-
tic discount factor of the RE model
mRE
t+1(zt+1) =¯
µ
ca
t+1(zt+1)
ca
t(zt)
¶¡°
(7)
Theonly e¤ect of LE on asset prices is thecomponent contributed by the shocks
to the cross-sectional distribution of consumption weights g(zt+1):
2.5 Implementation
In orderto generate an empirical timeseriesfor the LE stochasticdiscount factor
in (6) from cross-sectional consumption data we need to estimate the aggregate
consumption growth rate and the growth rate of the consumption weight distri-
bution:
g(zt+1) =
ht+1(zt+1)
ht(zt)
:
But from the risk sharing rule in (5) we know that this moment ofthe consump-
tion weight distribution satis…es:
ht(zt) =
£
»t(»0; st)
¤1=° ca
t(zt)
ct(»0; st)
For all unconstrained households the consumption weight does not change in
state st+1; »t+1(»0; st+1) = »t(»0; st); and hence their consumption growth rate
satis…es:
g(zt+1) =
ht+1(zt+1)
ht(zt)
=
ca
t+1(zt+1)
ca
t(zt)
¤
ct(»0; st)
ct+1(»0; st+1)
All unconstrained households have the same growth rate of consumption
ct+1(»0; st+1)
ct(»0; st)
=
ca
t+1(zt+1)=ht+1(zt+1)
ca
t(zt)=ht(zt)
:=gUC(zt+1) or
g(zt+1) =
µ
ct+1(»0; st+1)=ca
t+1(zt+1)
ct(»0;st)=ca
t(zt)
¶¡1
=
ga(zt+1)
gUC(zt+1)
; (8)
where ga(zt+1) is the growth rate of aggregate consumption and gUC(zt+1) is
the common consumption growth rate of currently unconstrained households.
Combining (8) and (6); we obtain the following simple representation of the
stochastic discount factor:
mLE
t+1(zt+1) =¯
¡
gUC(zt+1)
¢¡°
(9)
5Furthermore it is clear from (5) that currently constrained households have
consumption growth rates strictly higher than gUC(zt+1) since for those house-
holds »t+1(»0;st+1) > »t(»0; st): Consequently unconstrained households can be
empirically identi…ed as those households in the lower tail of the cross-sectional
consumption growth distribution
3 Testing the Empirical Asset Pricing Implications of
the Model
3.1 Data
Thecrucial di¤erencebetweentheRE andtheLE pricing kernel is that theformer
can be estimated using aggregate consumption data while for the latter data on
household level consumption growth is needed. The U.S. Consumer Expenditure
Survey provides such data since the majority of households sampled in this data
set reports consumption expenditures for at least two subsequent quarters.
We use quarterly data from 1980.1 to 2004.1. For each quarter t we select
all households which are complete income respondents and which report positive
expenditures on non durable goods and services forquarters t and t+1. For each
household we then compute quarterly growth rates of real (each component is
de‡ated with speci…c CPI’s), per-adult equivalent expenditures on nondurables.
We have a total of 284675 consumption growth rate observations.2
The return data comes from theCRSP (theCenter forResearch on Securities
Prices). Asstock returns weusethequarterly value-weighted return on theentire
US market (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ), de‡ated by the in‡ation rate computed
from theConsumer Price Index by the Bureau ofLabor Statistics. Bond returns
arebased on the averageyield ofa 3-month US T-bill, again de‡ated by theCPI.
3.2 Empirical Construction of the Asset Pricing Kernels
The main ingredient of the asset pricing kernel of the LE economy is a time
series for the growth rate of consumption expenditures of unconstrained house-
holds. The model suggests that in each period all unconstrained agents share
the same consumption growth rate, and that this growth rate is lower than con-
sumption growth for all constrained households. In the data there is signi…cant
measurement error in consumption. Moreover consumption growth in the data
is also likely to depend on idiosyncratic events (for example changes in personal
2Due to a change in the household sample there are no observations in the last quarter of
1985. For more details on the de‡ation method and on the categories included in nondurable
consumption expenditures see appendix A in Krueger and Perri (2006)
6health, oreducational expenses) which arenot explicitly considered in ourmodel.
For these reasons simply selecting the lowest observed consumption growth rate
would not bea very robust nor sensible way of selecting the consumption growth
of unconstrained households. Instead we select a level of consumption growth
which exhibits bunching (i.e. a large fraction of agents have consumption growth
closeto that level) and which is in theleft tail ofthe cross sectional consumption
growth rate distribution. Figure 1 shows the distribution of growth rate of con-
sumption expenditures in the …rst quarter of 2003 and suggests that empirically
plausible levels of consumption growth for theunconstrained lie between the30th
(denoted as P30 in the …gure) and the 50th percentile (median) of the consump-
tion growth distribution. In the following section we take the 40th percentile of
the consumption growth rate distribution as our benchmark estimate of the the
consumption growth rate ofthe unconstrained b gUC
t+1; but we also experiment with
setting it equal to the 30th or the 50th percentile.
FIGURE 1 HERE
Once the growth rate of the unconstrained consumers in each quarter has
been estimated, it is easy to construct a time series for the LE pricing kernel
according to (9); for a given risk aversion ° and time discount factor ¯:
^ mLE
t+1(°;¯) =¯
¡
b gUC
t+1
¢¡°
(10)
Below we also report results for the standard RE model computed with our
data for which the relevant stochastic discount factor is
^ mRA
t+1(°;¯) =¯
¡
^ ga
t+1
¢¡° :
Here ^ ga
t+1 is simply the growth rate of aggregate consumption in our CE sample
between quarters t and t+1:
3.3 Results
In this section we evaluate the performance of our pricing kernel in explaining
the equity premium for di¤erent values of the risk aversion parameter ° and
under di¤erent assumptions for the identi…cation of unconstrained agents. For
each speci…cation (including the RE stochastic discount factor) we set the time
discount factor ¯ so that the sample mean of the estimated stochastic discount
factor ET(^ m) is equal to 1. With this normalization3 we can write fe(^ m); the
3This normalization essentially guarantees that all stochastic discount factors we consider
rationalize the empirically observed risk-free interest rate.
7fraction of theequity premium that is being explained by thestochastic discount
factor ^ m; as
fe(^ m) =1 ¡
E
£
^ m
¡
RS ¡RB¢¤
E[RS ¡RB]
=¡Corr(^ m;RS ¡RB)cv( ^ m)cv(RS ¡RB)
whereRS
t+1 and RB
t+1 denote thegross real return on equity and a risk-free bond,
and Corr denotes a correlation, and cv denotes a coe¢cient of variation. Thus
to explain a large equity premium we need a stochastic discount factor (and thus
a consumption growth rate) that is negatively (positively) correlated with the
equitypremiumandvery volatile. Themain component ofthestochasticdiscount
factors under consideration is consumption growth. Therefore in …gure2 we plot
therealized excess return on equity RS ¡RB and aggregate consumption growth
^ ga, together with theconsumption growth rateofunconstrained households b gUC;
identi…ed as the the growth rate of the household at the 40th percentile of the
consumption growth distribution.
FIGURE 2 HERE
Note that both aggregate consumption growth (and thus the RE stochastic
discount factor) and theconsumption growthrateoftheunconstrained agentsare
much less volatile than the equity premium. The key di¤erence between the two
growth rates series lies in their correlation with the excess return on equity. This
correlation is slightly negative (-0.02) for ^ ga while it is slightly positive for ^ gUC
(0.06). This di¤erence in the correlation is at the heart of the di¤erencebetween
theequity premium explained by thetwo models that wereport in …gure3.4 The
…gure plots the equity premium produced by theRE and LE models; the growth
rate of the unconstrained agents in the LE model is estimated as the 30th, 40th
and 50th percentile of the consumption growth distribution. We also plot the
average equity premium in the data, 1:76%; on a quarterly basis. For moderate
levels of risk aversion. the equity premia implied by the LE models, while larger
than the oneimplied by the RE, still fall signi…cantly short of the 1.76 % target.
For higher risk aversion some versions of the LE model do signi…cantly better
than the RE model. This suggests that this LE model may provide us with a
better understanding of how aggregate risk is priced.
FIGURE 3 HERE
4As a robustness check we also measured aggregate consumption growth from NIPA data. In
our sample aggregate consumption growth from NIPA is slightly more correlated with the equity
premium (the correlation is 0.13) but its volatility is only about one third of the volatility of
the growth rate computed from CE data. As a consequence, as it is well known, the RE pricing
kernel explains only a small fraction of the observed equity premium.
84 Conclusion
The standard representative agent model can only account for a small fraction
of the equity premium. In this paper we show that introducing limited en-
forcement of intertemporal contracts improves the empirical performance of the
consumption-based asset pricing model. In a standard LE model with a contin-
uum of households the stochastic discount factor is a function of consumption
growth of households in the left tail of the cross-sectional consumption growth
distribution. We …nd that the LE pricing kernel can account for a signi…cantly
larger share of the empirically observed equity premium (but not for the entire
premium). Futurework is needed to assess how careful modelling ofmeasurement
error inindividual consumption growth woulda¤ect theempirical estimationand
performance of the proposed asset pricing kernel, and to investigate whether it
can shed further light on other well-documented asset pricing puzzles (such as
the value premium puzzle).
References
[1] Alvarez, Fernando and Urban Jermann (2000), “E¢ciency, Equilibrium, and
Asset Pricing with Risk of Default,” Econometrica, 68, 775-798
[2] Alvarez, Fernando and Urban Jermann (2001), “Quantitative Asset Pricing
Implications of Endogenous Solvency Constraints,” Review of Financial
Studies, 14, 1117-1151
[3] Brav, Alon, George Constantinides and Christopher Geczy (2002), “Asset
Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers,” Journal of Political Economy,
110, 793-824.
[4] Cogley, Tim (2002), “Idiosyncratic Risk and the Equity Premium: Evi-
dence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 49, 309-334.
[5] Constantinides, George and Darrell Du¢e, “Asset pricing with heteroge-
neous consumers”, Journal of Political Economy, 104 (1996), 219-240.
[6] Kehoe, Tim and David Levine (1993), “Debt Constrained Asset Markets,”
Review of Economic Studies, 60, 865–888.
[7] Kocherlakota, Narayana and Luigi Pistaferri (2005), “Asset Pricing Impli-
cations of Pareto Optimality with Private Information,” Working paper,
University of Minnesota.
[8] Krueger, Dirk and Fabrizio Perri (2006), “Does Income Inequality lead to
Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory” Review of Economic
9Studies, 73, 163-193.
[9] Lustig, Hanno (2004), “The Market PriceofAggregateRisk and the Wealth
Distribution,” Working paper, UCLA.
[10] Marcet, Albert and Ramon Marimon (1998), “Recursive Contracts,” Work-
ing paper, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[11] Mehra, Rajnish and Edward Prescott (1985), “The equity premium: A puz-
zle” Journal of Monetary Economics 15, 145-61
[12] Thomas, Jonathan and Tim Worrall (1988), “Self-Enforcing Wage Con-
tracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 55, 541-554.
[13] Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette (2002), “Limited Asset Market Participation
and the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution”, Journal of Political
Economy, 110, 825–53.
100 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0
50
100
150
200
250
Mean
P30
Median
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
Consumption growth, c
t+1/c
t
Figure 1. Histogram of the consumption growth distribution in the CE, 2003Q11982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Year
I
n
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
Figure 2. Consumption Growth and Equity Premium
 
 
Excess Returns on Stocks
Aggregate Consumption Growth
Consumption Growth of Unconstrained (P40)0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Risk Aversion
I
n
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
Figure 3. Explained Quarterly Equity Premium
 
 
Limited Enforcement Models
Representative Agent Model
Premium to be explained P40
P30
P50CFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2006/22  Dirk Krueger 
Hanno Lustig 
Fabrizio Perri 
Evaluation Asset Pricing Models with Limited 
Commitment using Household Consumption Data 
2006/21  Juan Carlos Conesa 
Sagiri Kitao 
Dirk Krueger 
Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All! 
2006/20  Annamaria Lusardi 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Roles of 
Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth  
2006/19  Carol C. Bertaut 
Michael Haliassos 
Credit Cards: Facts and Theories 
2006/18  Dirk Krueger 
Alexander Ludwig 
On the Consequences of Demographic Change for 
Rates of Returns to Capital, and the Distribution of 
Wealth and Welfare  
2006/17  Franklin Allen 
Elena Carletti 
Mark-to-Market Accounting and Liquidity Pricing 
2006/16  Erik Hurst 
Arthur Kennickell 
Annamaria Lusardi 
Francisco Torralba 
Precautionary Savings and the Importance of 
Business Owners 
2006/15  Arthur Kennickell 
Annamaria Lusardi 
Disentangling the Importance of the Precautionary 
Saving Motive 
2006/14  Yanis Bilias, 
Dimitris Georgarakos 
Michael Haliassos 
Portfolio Inertia and Stock Market Fluctuations 
2006/13  Lars Jonung 
Ludger Schuknecht 
Mika Tujula 
The Boom-Bust Cycle in Finland and Sweden 
1984-1995 in an International Perspective 
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  